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Federal Priority Statute Gives United States Nontax 




In a proceeding under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act1 for the 
reorganization of an insolvent corporation, the United States claimed 
first priority for nontax debts2 under the federal priority statute, 
Revised Statutes § 3466.3 The trustee of the corporation contested 
the claim to priority on the ground that section 199 of Chapter X,4 
which in effect provides the United States in Chapter X proceedings 
with priority only for tax and customs claims, is exclusive and 
therefore R.S. § 3466 does not apply. The district court denied 
the claim to priority. On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit, held, reversed, one judge dissenting. R.S. § 3466 is operative 
to give all debts due to the United States priority in a Chapter X 
corporate reorganization proceeding. 
Under English common law the Crown enjoyed an absolute 
priority over all other creditors of an insolvent debtor. Attributed 
to royal prerogative, this deference to the Crown was based on the 
necessity of preserving government revenue.5 The Supreme Court 
has held this sovereign priority to be superseded in this country 
by a statutory grant of federal priority; consequently, the United 
States must look solely to statutes when advancing its claims.6 How-
• 334 F.2d lll (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 879 (1964). 
1. 52 Stat. 883 (1938), ll U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1958). 
2. The claims, amounting to $904,634,124, were filed by the Maritime Adminis-
tration, Small Business Administration, Departments of the Army and Navy, and the 
Post Office Department. 
3. REv. STAT. § 3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1954) (hereinafter cited as R.S. § 3466) 
reads in full: "Whenever any person indebted to the United States is insolvent, or 
whenever the estate of any deceased debtor, in the hands of the executors or adminis-
trators, is insufficient to pay all the debts due from the deceased, the debts due to 
the United States shall be first satisfied; and the priority established shall extend as 
well to cases in which a debtor, not having sufficient property to pay all his debts, 
makes a voluntary assignment thereof, or in which the estate and effects of an abscond-
ing, concealed, or absent debtor are attached by process of law, as to cases in which 
an act of bankruptcy is committed." 
4. 52 Stat. 893 (1938), II U.S.C. § 599 (1958), reads in part: "If, in any proceeding 
under this chapter, the United States is a secured or unsecured creditor on claims 
for taxes or customs duties, ... no plan which does not provide for the payment 
thereof shall be confirmed by the judge except upon the acceptance of a lesser amount 
by the Secretary of the Treasury ••.. " The priority thus conferred by § 199 "is superior 
to all other claims against the estate, even to existing and perfected liens which might 
otherwise be prior." 2 MOORE 8c OGLEBAY, CORPORATE REORGANIZATION § 9.17 (1948). 
But see FINI.ETIER, BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION 391 (1939). 
5. See Small Business Administration v. McClellan, 364 U.S. 446 (1960); United 
States v. Oklahoma, 261 U.S. 253 (1923); United States v. Bank of N.C., 31 U.S. 29 
(1832); Logan, Priorities and Lien Preferences Accorded Federal and State Claims in 
Corporate Reorganizations, 16 TAXES 201 (1938). 
6. See United States v. Oklahoma, supra note 5; United States v. Bank of N.C., 
supra note 5. 
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ever, before the United States can utilize R.S. § 3466, the debtor 
must be insolvent. The standard for determining insolvency under 
R.S. § 3466 is the balance sheet test: whether the corporation has 
more liabilities (other than capital stock) than assets.7 In addition, al-
though section 64 of the Bankruptcy Act8 incorporates R.S. § 3466 
into Chapters I through VII by indirect reference9 section 64 was 
expressly made inapplicable to Chapter X.10 
The trustee in the principal case argued that R.S. § 3466 should 
not be deemed applicable to Chapter X proceedings in the absence 
of a provision incorporating it. He cited Davis v. Pringle,11 which 
held R.S. § 3466 inapplicable to the Bankruptcy Act as it then 
read. In Davis the Supreme Court considered the 1906 version 
of section 64,12 which gave priority to "any person who by the laws 
of the United States is entitled to priority ... " and decided that 
"any person" did not include the United States; therefore it was 
held that this passage was not intended to be an indirect reference to 
R.S. § 3466. After thus disposing of the possibility that section 
64 might serve to incorporate R.S. § 3466 into the Bankruptcy Act, 
the Davis Court refuted the proposition that R.S. § 3466 should nev-
ertheless apply to the Bankruptcy Act because of its nature as a 
general priority statute . .The Court reasoned that the terms of the 
Bankruptcy Act dealing with priorities (section 64) were all-
encompassing and therefore exclusive, preventing the application 
of R.S. § 3466. Congress subsequently amended section 64,13 expressly 
including the United States in the term "persons." As a result, 
R.S. § 3466 now applies to Chapters I through VII. However, the 
reasoning of Davis regarding the exclusiveness of the priority 
provisions would still seem applicable in Chapter X, where there 
7. See Bramwell v. United States Fid. Co., 269 U.S. 483, 487 (1926); United States 
v. Fabricated Air Prods. Co., 206 F. Supp. 228 (E.D. Tex. 1962). 
8. 30 Stat. 563 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 104 (Supp. V, 1964), provides in 
part: "(a) The debts to have priority, in advance of the payment • . • to creditors, 
and to be paid in full out of bankrupt estates, and the order of payment, shall be .•• 
(5) debts owing to any person, including the United States, who by the laws of the 
United States in [sic] entitled to priority .•.• " 
9. The phrase in § 64a(5) which grants priority to any person "who by the laws 
of the United States is entitled to priority .•. ," clearly refers to R.S. § 3466. 3 COLLIER, 
BANKRUPTCY § 64.501 (14th ed. 1964). There are cases which hold that R.S. § 3466 
is not applicable to proceedings in bankruptcy. Adams v. O'Malley, 182 F.2d 
925 (8th Cir. 1950); In re Taylorcraft Aviation Corp., 76 F. Supp. 81 (N.D. Ohio 1947), 
aff'd, 168 F.2d 808 (6th Cir. 1948). These, however, appear to be based upon an 
erroneous conception that § 64 entirely abrogates R.S. § 3466 whereas it seems more 
accurate to consider that § 64 is in pari materia with R.S. § 3466, and partly super-
sedes it. See In re Jacobson, 263 Fed. 883 (7th Cir. 1920). 
10. 52 Stat. 883 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 502 (1958). Section 64 was eliminated from 
Chapter X because the rigid scheme of priorities established by it was regarded as 
unsuitable in reorganizations. 6 COLLIER, op. cit. supra note 9, § 9.13(2). 
11. 268 U.S. 315 (1925). 
12. 30 Stat. 563 (1898), as amended, 34 Stat. 267 (1906). 
13. 44 Stat. 666 (1926). See note 8 supra. 
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is no incorporation of R.S. § 3466 because section 64 is expressly 
excluded. Nevertheless, the majority in the principal case concluded 
that R.S. § 3466 should be held inapplicable only if the terms 
of Chapter X evidenced an intention to cover all matters of 
priorities or were inconsistent with R.S. § 3466; and they found 
neither such exclusivity nor such inconsistencies. The court rea-
soned that Chapter X was intended to include all the priorities 
available in equity receivership cases because of its equity re-
ceivership background, referred to in section 115 of the chapter.14 
Since the priorities expressly provided for in Chapter X do not 
encompass the broad range of priorities found in equity receiver-
ship cases, the court concluded that the express priorities were 
not meant to be exclusive. In addition, the court noted that sec-
tion 199 of Chapter X, which gives only tax and customs claims 
priority, is applicable in the reorganization of "solvent" as well 
as "insolvent" corporations. Therefore, the court apparently rea-
soned, section 199's grant of priorities has a different scope from 
that of R.S. § 3466, the latter applying only to "insolvent" corpora-
tions, and thus section 199's inclusion in Chapter X is not incon-
sistent with the application of R.S. § 3466 to Chapter X.15 
Even though the court's reasoning appears logical, its choice 
of language here is somewhat misleading, for it is clear that section 
199 does not unqualifiedly apply to solvent corporations. The 
provisions of Chapter X cannot be invoked unless certain insolven-
cy requirements are met. Chapter X requires all reorganization 
14. 52 Stat. 884 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 515 (1958), which provides that the court shall 
"exercise all the powers ••. which a court of the United States would have if it had 
appointed a receiver in equity of the property of the debtor on the ground of in-
solvency or inability to meet its debts as they mature." 
A draftsman of Chapter X testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee that the 
priorities applicable under Chapter X would be those indicated in equity receivership 
cases. John Gerdes, Hearings on H.R. 8046 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, 75th Cong., 2d &: 3d Sess. 77 (1937-38). Section 77B of the 
Bankruptcy Act, 48 Stat. 912 (1934), was clearly formulated to supplant the equity 
receivership procedure, the most popular means of reorganizing a corporation before 
1934. 6 COLLIER, op. cit. supra note 9, § 3.17. The goals of bankruptcy and reor-
ganization proceedings are divergent; the former having the object of liquidating for 
the benefit of creditors, while the latter contemplates continuance of the corporation 
as a going concern. The limitation by § 77B of the right of non-assenting creditors 
to demand cash settlements was held constitutional as an exercise of the bankruptcy 
power. See FINLEITER, op. cit. supra note 4, at 3. Before the enactment of 77B there 
were three ways of achieving corporate reorganization: through a voluntary arrange-
ment entered into between the debtor and its creditors; through formal bankruptcy 
procedure, using the composition section of the Bankruptcy Act (§ 12) or using bank-
ruptcy sale to purchase assets by arrangement with the creditors; and through an 
equity receivership obtained on a creditor's bill. 6 COLLIER, op. cit. supra note 9, 
§ 0.01. 
15. The court also considered the argument that §§ 107 and 216, which deal with 
creditors' rights under Chapter X, were inconsistent with R.S. § 3466 priority. Citing 
Guarantee Co. v. Title Guar. Co., 224 U.S. 152 (1912), the court responded to these 
arguments by noting that the United States "is not bound by provisions of an in-
solvency law unless specifically mentioned therein." Principal case at 116. 
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petitions to state "that the corporation is insolvent or unable to 
pay its debts as they mature."16 The inability to pay debts as they 
mature is the equity standard for insolvency,17 and its incorporation 
into the Bankruptcy Act reflects the equity receivership history of 
Chapter X.18 Use of this insolvency test permits the initiation 
of proceedings before the floundering corporation is so far in debt 
that it cannot be successfully reorganized.19 Thus the difference in 
scope between section 199 and R.S. § 3466 is not so great as the 
court's language implies. Section 199 merely renders tax and cus-
toms priority uniformly applicable under all Chapter X proceed-
ings. But the nontax claims of R.S. § 3466 will not be uniformly ap-
plicable. There would seem to be no rational basis for giving the 
Government's nontax claims highest priority under some Chapter 
X proceedings (when the corporation meets the bankruptcy in-
solvency requirement and thus R.S. § 3466 can be invoked) while 
giving them no priority at all under others (when only the equity 
insolvency requirement is met and R.S. § 3466 is not available). In 
no other place in the chapter does the type of insolvency engender 
such a functional dichotomy.20 Perhaps this is a valid indication 
that Congress intended to give no priority at all to nontax claims. 
The court does not answer the question why Congress, if it had 
wanted to insure the application of R.S. § 3466, did not take the 
simple and obvious step of including a provision in Chapter X to 
that effect. This congressional omission would seem circumspect in 
light of the previous necessity of amending the Bankruptcy Act 
after Davis v. Pringle.21 
However, the use of R.S. § 3466 in equity receiverships was by no 
means automatic. Even when the strict balance sheet insolvency re-
quirement was met, the courts did not feel obliged to apply R.S. 
§ 3466 if policy considerations suggested otherwise. Two cases con-
16. Section 130(1), 52 Stat. 886 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 530 (1958). 
17. 6 COLLIER, op. cit. supra note 9, § 4.14(2). 
18. See generally Blair, The Priority of the United States in Equity Receiverships, 
39 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1925), for a thorough discussion of the R.S. § 3466 insolvency 
requirement. 
19. 6 COLLIER, op. cit. supra note 9, § 4.14(2). 
20. See Silver&: Tondel, Reorganization Under Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act-
1931-1939, 49 HARV. L. REv. 1111, 1179 (1936), where it was suggested that the dif-
ference in insolvency requirements between R.S. § 3466 and § 77B, the predecessor 
of Chapter X, might preclude the application of R.S. § 3466. It was assumed that 
the 1935 amendment to § 77B, 49 Stat. 965 (1935), which added the forerunner of § 199, 
resolved the question even though the amendment did not pertain to nontax matters. 
21. Some commentators have expressed the view that since Chapter X has no 
provision similar to § 64, the federal government has no priority by way of R.S. § 3466. 
Bernhardt, Government Priority for Repayment of Monies Advanced to Contractors, 
20 REF. J. 35, 41 (1946); Friendly, Some Comments on the Corporate Reorganizations 
Act, 48 HARV. L. REv. 39, 60-61 (1934). In addition, an occasional case subsequent to 
the enactment of Chapter X holds that R.S. § 3466 has no application anyivhere in 
the Bankruptcy Act, seemingly misconstruing the import of § 64 which incorporates 
R.S. § 3466 by indirect reference. See note 9 supra. 
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cerning the repercussions of government management of railroads 
during World War I provide illustrations. In Mellon v. Michigan 
Trust22 the United States, in the person of the Director General of 
Railroads, asserted priority for transportation charges and tort claims 
against an insolvent corporation which had gone into equity receiver-
ship. The Court held that the policy manifested in the Federal Con-
trol Act23 indicated that the United States, when engaged in a com-
mercial venture, should have no greater rights than other creditors. 
In United States v. Guaranty Trust Co.,24 the Court denied priority 
for a federal loan to a railroad which had become insolvent and had 
gone into equity receivership. By means of Title II of the Transpor-
tation Act of 1920,25 which granted authority for making the 
loan, Congress meant to preserve the national railroad system 
by shoring up its somewhat unstable post-war credit. The Court 
observed that to give priority to debts due the United States would 
defeat this policy of Congress, as the prospect of the United States 
in the position of a privileged creditor could hardly encourage 
the re-establishment of railroad credit among bankers and investors.211 
Similar policy considerations were not so persuasive in the case 
of United States v. Emory,21 which held R.S. § 3466 applicable 
to a United States claim under the National Housing Act in an 
equity receivership procteding. The Court, after holding that 
the R.S. § 3466's insolvency requirements had been met, determined 
that the purpose of the priority statute was "to secure adequate public 
revenues to sustain the public burden. . . ."28 However, a strong 
dissent pointed out that the Housing Act was not a revenue meas-
ure, but was intended to stimulate recovery and employment 
in the construction industry.29 The dissent then declared that it 
had been "apparent that, each time this Court has considered 
legislative purpose as to R.S. § 3466 in relation to government claims 
under public financial legislation affecting creditors competing with 
the Government, it has determined that R.S. § 3466 did not apply."80 
As the language of these cases indicates, policy considerations 
present when considering government priority for nontax claims 
may be significantly different from those which exist in tax and 
customs situations. Many of the federal government's nontax claims 
22. 271 U.S. 236 (1926). 
23. 40 Stat. 451, 456 (1918) provided that the carriers while under federal control 
would be subject to all laws and liability as common carriers, and it stripped them 
of immunity from suit. 
24. 280 U.S. 478 (1930). 
25. 41 Stat. 456, 457-69 (1920). 
26. 280 U.S. 478, 485 (1930). Cf. Cook County Nat'l Bank v. United States, 107 
U.S. 445 (1882). 
27. 314 U.S. 423 (1941). 
28. Id. at 426. 
29. Id. at 435. 
30. Id. at 437. 
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arise from federal activity in the realm of private enterprise, such 
as loans under the Federal Housing and Small Business Acts or 
from the operation of facilities which historically are not essentially 
governmental functions, such as the wartime management of rail-
roads or TV A.31 Here it would not seem unjust to strip the govern-: 
ment of the sovereign priority which R.S. § 3466 represents. The 
government as a tax collector should not be considered an ordinary 
creditor, for in this role it has no choice of debtors; it is the creditor 
of all taxpayers.32 But the government as a lender of money or renter 
of services does have a choice of debtors. Therefore, it becomes 
possible to exercise the prudence that a private creditor finds neces-
sary, and in fact such prudence may be provided for in the acts 
authorizing government extension of credit.83 It is arguable that 
it was just these considerations which prompted Congress to allow 
the government highest priority for tax and customs claims through 
section 199, although it made no corresponding mention of nontax 
claims. The brief dissent in the principal case apparently takes cog-
nizance of these arguments, maintaining that it is not unreasonable 
in the reorganization of a business enterprise that all claims of the 
same class should be treated alike. 
The facts of the principal case itself provide a striking example 
of how the application of R.S. § 3466 to nontax claims may defeat 
the policy embodied in a congressional act. One of the government 
claims34 was filed by the Small Business Administration, which was 
created for the purpose of joining with private lenders in making 
available loans to small business concerns that are unable to obtain 
capital improvement loans on reasonable terms from private 
lenders.311 It was created not to supplant or compete with private 
credit sources but to encourage and cooperate with them.36 The 
priority now granted to SBA claims lends itself to the opposite 
result: private creditors must now be wary of any government 
31. As early as 1924 it was said that "the contractual operations of the federal 
government and of the states have become so extensive and so involved with the 
business of private citizens that priority to the federal government and to the states, 
except for taxes, would operate as an oppressive hardship on other creditors of 
bankrupts." Davis v. Pringle, I F.2d 860, 864 (4th Cir. 1924), afj'd, 268 U.S. 315 (1925). 
32. See generally Friesen, Collection of Federal Taxes Out of the T1J.Xpayer's 
Property-A Judicial Shell Game, 9 KAN. L. R.Ev. 263, 264 (1961). 
33. Referring to the Transportation Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 456, 457-69, the court 
in United States v. Guaranty Trust Co., 280 U.S. 478, 485 (1930), said, "the giving of 
adequate security was either required or left to the discretion of the President. 
Under § 210 no advance could be made, unless •.. [there was] ••. reasonable assur-
ance that the loan would be repaid •••. " 
34. Principal case at ll3. 
35. See, e.g., Small Business Administration v. McClellan, 364 U.S. 446 (1960); 
W. T. Jones & Co. v. Foodco Realty, Inc., 318 F.2d 881 (4th Cir. 1963); Gilbertson, 
Small Business Financing Under the Small Business Act and the Small Business In-
vestment Act of 1958, 8 KAN. L. R.Ev. 538, 539 (1960). 
36. See Gilbertson, supra note 35, at 552. 
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nontax claims against a corporation.37 Private lenders "cooperating" 
with the SBA can be injured because government priority for SBA 
loans has been held to apply only to that portion of the debt actually 
loaned by the SBA; otherwise the priority provided in R.S. § 3466 
would not operate solely for the purpose of securing the government 
an adequate revenue, but would also serve to benefit private 
persons.38 Thus a private lender acting in concert with the SBA 
could find itself cut off from any share in the debtor's assets by 
the SBA's priority. 
The decision in the principal case represents a significant 
expansion of R.S. § 3466 priority into an area where it previously 
had not clearly been deemed applicable.39 Once applicable, the R.S. 
§ 3466 priority has been held to take precedence over many pre-
existing liens through a development of the doctrine of the inchoate 
lien. This doctrine makes only the most definite liens, if any, 
effective against federal priority under• R.S. § 3466.40 The United 
States now enjoys by virtue of R.S. § 3466 a highly privileged 
position in Chapter X proceedings, possibly beyond that which would 
be deemed proper even under the English common-law sovereign 
prerogative doctrine. Even if the majority in the principal case 
had demonstrated that R.S. § 3466 is not in conflict with the 
provisions of Chapter X, it has not shown any affirmative congres-
sional intention that R.S. § 3466 should apply to the Chapter. Such 
37. In an article which concluded that the generally strong federal priority had 
an unfortunate effect on the extension of private credit, the SBA was somewhat 
ironically described as an "attempt to aid debtors through stimulating loans by private 
creditors who have, with good cause, become wary." MacLachlan, Improving the Law 
of Federal Liens and Priorities, 1 BOSTON COLI.EGE INDUSTRIAL &: COMMERCIAL L, REY. 
73, 80 (1959). 
38. See Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25 (1952); W. T. Jones &: Co. v, Foodco 
Realty, Inc., 318, F.2d 881 (4th Cir. 1963). 
39. One other case, Matter of Cherry Valley Homes, Inc., 255 F.2d 706 (3d Cir, 
1958), cert. denied, DliBois v. United States, 358 U.S. 864 (1958), has held, as an 
alternative ground, that R.S. § 3466 applies to Chapter X proceedings. In that case 
the United States had levied on the property of a taxpayer for taxes and served 
appropriate notice on a corporation which owed a liquidated sum to the taxpayer. 
The corporation was not insolvent at the time of the levy and did not file a reorgani• 
zation petition until five months later. As the primary ground for granting the United 
States priority, the court held the levy effectively and exclusively appropriated the 
debt to the satisfaction of the tax claim. As a second ground, the tax levy was held 
to accomplish at law an assignment of the taxpayer's claim to the United States and 
R.5. § 3466 was applied. 
40. For a thorough treatment of this development, see generally Kennedy, The 
Relative Priority of the Federal Government-The Pernicious Career of the Inchoate 
and General Lien, 63 YALE L.J. 905 (1954). For a lien to be specific and not inchoate, 
it must be definite in three respects: (1) the identity of the lienor; (2) the amount of 
the lien; (3) the property to which it attaches. See Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 
329 U.S. 362 (1946); Annot., 36 A.L.R.2d 1204. Since the courts have established the 
doctrine, no law has yet been found by the Supreme Court to be sufficiently "choate" 
to override the federal priority in any case in which the statute has been applied. 
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an extension of this potent federal priority without a clear congres-
sional mandate would seem open to question in view of the noted 
dissimilarity between tax and nontax policy considerations.41 
41. A bill to amend R.S. § !!466, which would substantially reduce federal priority, 
has been introduced into the House of Representatives. State and local taxes would 
be accorded equality with federal taxes, and all taxes would have lower priority than 
administrative and funeral expenses and wage claims. United States nontax claims 
would be given equal priority with rent claims, which follow taxes. H.R. 495!!, 88th 
Cong., 1st Sess. § 201 (196!!). But see H.R. 12545 and 12546, introduced Sept. 2, 1964. 
